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The International Criminal Court and the Applicability
of International Jurisdiction under Islamic Law
Ahmad E. Nassar*

I. INTRODUCTION
Customarily, globalization refers to the increasing activity of transnational
actors and the resulting push for greater international legal harmonization to
facilitate expanding business relations. But globalization could also refer to the
expansion of criminal law of universal applicability, such as the universal law
against "crimes against humanity."' Although this expansion, having taken place
throughout the twentieth century, is not particularly recent, since September 11,
2001, the ability to enforce universal criminal laws has taken on greater
significance.
Previously, countries would rarely allow outside authorities to exercise
jurisdiction over their own citizens or even other nations' citizens residing within
their territory. More often than not, disputes were resolved either by some
manner of negotiation and settlement or armed conflict. Sometimes negotiations
were based on bilateral or multilateral treaties requiring parties to try or extradite
criminals, and other times were based solely on comity. Regardless of the
method of determining the appropriate jurisdiction, it has become increasingly
important that countries agree on a forum for the effective prosecution of
terrorists. The International Criminal Court ("ICC") provides an interesting
alternative to the traditional manners of determining the appropriate jurisdiction
for trying international criminal offenses.
When one now mentions the word "terrorist," it conjures up stereotypical
images of bearded Middle Eastern men desirous of martyrdom. While this is
indeed unfortunate, it raises the issue of what more can be done to curb
terrorism and other crimes against humanity arising from or occurring in
BA 2001, University of Michigan; JD Candidate 2004, University of Chicago.
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"Crimes against humanity" are defined in Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. Agreement
between the United States of America and the French Republic, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Respecting
the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Charter
of the International Military Tribunal art 6(c), 59 Star 1544, 1547 (1945).
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predominantly Muslim countries. Many commentators may choose to target
Muslim countries' varying degrees of application of Islamic law as a roadblock
on the path towards world peace and prosperity. This Development will address
whether international jurisdiction in general, and the ICC in particular, are
compatible with Islamic law. Part II will deal with the compatibility of Islamic
law with modern international law. Subpart A will examine the contemporary
rules of international jurisdiction, while Subpart B will consider the issue under
the lens of Islamic law. Finally, Part III will analyze the ICC and its relevance to
Islamic law countries.
II. COMPATIBILITY OF ISLAMIC LAW WITH MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Modern international law has changed dramatically in the past fifty years.
In contrast, Islamic law, or the Shari'ah,2 is over fourteen centuries old, and has
been viewed in recent times as somewhat monolithic. The question is therefore a
basic issue of coexistence: can a jurisdiction wishing to apply the Shari'ah fulfill
its obligations under contemporary international law? In particular, how are
international jurisdiction principles to be applied?
A. CONTEMPORARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
There are three main varieties of jurisdiction discussed in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law ("Restatement"): prescriptive, adjudicative, and
enforcement jurisdiction.' Prescriptive jurisdiction is the authority of a state to
apply its own laws to persons and activities.4 Adjudicative jurisdiction is the
"authority of a state to subject particular persons or things to its judicial
process." 5 More generally, adjudicative jurisdiction is the requisite legal power to
bind the defendant with a judgment-hence it focuses on the relationship
between the adjudicating body and the defendant. Enforcement jurisdiction is
simply the power to enforce laws; it is the ability to use government resources to
"induce or compel compliance" with state law.6 Traditionally, all7 three types of
jurisdiction must be present for a state to detain and try a suspect.
Asserting international prescriptive jurisdiction under the Restatement can
be achieved using any one of five alternatives: territorial, nationality, protective,
passive personality, or universal jurisdiction. Territorial jurisdiction, universally
2

"Shari'ah" is simply the Arabic word for Islamic law. The two terms are used interchangeably
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throughout this Development.
See Barry E. Carter and Phillip R. Trimble, InternationalLan 710-11 (Aspen 3d ed 1999).
Id at 711.
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accepted under international law, involves the "exercise of jurisdiction by a state
over property, persons, acts, or events occurring within its territory."8 Though
territorial jurisdiction is clearly recognized, it often comes up short in
prosecuting international terrorists, most of whom flee the victim-state upon
commission of the crime. Nationality jurisdiction suffers from a similar lack of
bite. It is defined as jurisdiction over a state's own nationals and is also nearly
universal in its application.9 The problem with nationality jurisdiction is that
most international terrorists are not nationals of the victim-states.
The protective principle and the passive personality principle are two
forms of prescriptive jurisdiction that are particularly relevant in the context of
prosecuting international terrorists. The protective principle derives from
§ 402(3) of the Restatement, which allows a state to claim jurisdiction with
respect to "certain conduct outside its territory."'" This conduct must be
committed by persons who are not its nationals and "directed against the
security of the state or a limited class of other state interests."" This principle
allows a nation to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct potentially
interferes with national security or the operation of governmental functions. 2
Similarly, the passive personality principle stems from § 4 02 (g) of the
Restatement. Under this concept, a state may apply its law-particularly its
criminal law-to an act committed outside its territory by a person who is not its
national, where the victim of that act was its national. 3 The passive personality
principle is not "generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes," but it is
accepted for "terrorist and other organized attacks" on nationals. 4 American
courts have limited the effect of the passive personality principle, stating that the
mere fact that an act outside the US impacts an American citizen does not
necessarily mean that the US can exert jurisdiction over the actor."' It is
important to note that although application of either the protective or passive
personality principle may result in a valid assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction, in
most instances it is not enough to entitle the accusing state to demand
extradition absent an applicable extradition treaty with the country in question.
8

Id at 713.
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See, for example, United States v Romero-Galue, 757 F2d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir 1985) (applying
protective principle as an independent basis of jurisdiction to "prosecute foreign nationals on
foreign vessels on the high seas for possession of narcotics").
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 4 02 (g) (cited in note
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See United States v Columba-Collela, 604 F2d 356, 359 (5th Cir 1979) (using the objective
territorial principle to determine that there was no basis for jurisdiction because the
defendant had not threatened the security of the US or intended to produce effects within it).

§ 402(3)

(1987).
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Thus, adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction may not be possible,
notwithstanding the claim of prescriptive jurisdiction.
The last form of prescriptive jurisdiction is universal jurisdiction. An act
subject to universal jurisdiction is one that "is contrary to the interests of the
international community," leading to the right of any state "to apprehend and
punish the offenders." 16 Currently, there are only two firmly established cases of
universal jurisdiction: piracy and war crimes.'" Although states often assert a
right of universal jurisdiction, including over acts of terrorism, this has proven to
be very controversial. 8 In fact, this controversy has provided much of the
impetus for establishing an international criminal court and is discussed in more
detail in Part III.
Although prescriptive jurisdiction must be established to justify the
application of a state's laws, absent adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction,
prescriptive jurisdiction is insufficient to enable the prosecution of crimes.
However, there are several multilateral conventions making certain crimes
internationally punishable, requiring states to either extradite or punish the
offenders.' 9 Most Muslim countries are parties to these conventions, and have
thereby agreed to be bound by their requirements. With regard to terrorism in
particular, some scholars even believe that the duty to extradite or prosecute is
now a part of customary law in the international community. Professor Oscar
Schachter states that "[t]he condemnation of international terrorism thus
imposes an obligation on all States to take appropriate measures to prevent acts
of international terrorism. . . . When suspected terrorists are apprehended the
State must either extradite or try and punish them. This obligation, I believe, is
now general customary international law."2 Thus, even absent specific
extradition treaties, there may be an obligation to either prosecute or extradite
under multilateral conventions and customary international law.
Only once a duty for a state to act, or at the very least a duty not to
interfere, exists can there be any alleged conflict with Islamic law. The inquiry as
to the compatibility with the Shari'ah is a three-step process. The first step is to
determine the extent to which the duty to extradite or prosecute is generally
considered part of applicable multilateral conventions or customary international
law. The second step is to determine whether Muslim countries have, for the
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Carter and Trimble, InternationalLawat 718 (cited in note 3).
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See, for example, Filartga v Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980); Regina v Bow Street
Metropolitan Stipendiagy Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), [20001 1 AC 147 (House of
Lords 1999) (UK).
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951), 78 UN
Treaty Ser 277; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (1984), 1465 UN Treaty Ser 85.
Oscar Schachter, InternationalLawin Theogy and Practice163 (Kluwer 1991).
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most part, accepted these responsibilities under international law. If the Muslim
countries have indeed accepted these responsibilities, the third step is to
determine whether they can be reconciled with Islamic law.
To answer the preliminary question as to whether an international duty
exists, one must first look to the traditional sources of international law.
Examining existing treaty law applicable to Muslim countries, it is readily
apparent that a government cannot overtly or tacitly assist terrorists seeking
shelter within its borders.2 This, however, is not dispositive regarding the issue
of the compatibility of the Shari'ah with international law. Although many
countries purport to apply Islamic law in some manner, it is often isolated to

particular areas of the law such as family law and is not applied as an overall
foundation of jurisprudence. This raises the question of whether international
law is compatible with a broader application of the Shari'ah in Muslim countries.
B. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION UNDER ISLAMIC LAW

The Qur'an, Islam's holy book and first primary source of law, has little to
say regarding state sovereignty, international jurisdiction, or extradition. In
addition, prophetic pronouncements on these issues are sparse.22 Effective
recourse, however, may be had by examining other areas of the Shari'ah. For
instance, contract law, in Islamic jurisprudence, places a high emphasis on
freedom of contract.23 Moreover, it is a bedrock of Islamic law that everything is
permissible unless specifically forbidden.24 Provided that neither the subject
matter of the contract nor the consideration provided violates the Shari'ah, the
contract must be honored. If a party, whether Muslim or not, breaches the
contract, it is up to the judiciary to enforce its provisions. The UN Charter and
any convention to which a country is a party all constitute contracts and thus
must be treated as such by the contracting parties and by the courts.
Contrary to many views on Islamic law, a more thorough application of the
Shari'ah would not be a hindrance to adherence to international law and in fact
could serve as a tool in establishing widespread compliance. Many wanted or
suspected international Muslim criminals consider international law, and the UN
21

See, for example, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
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adopted by UN General Assembly Res No 52/164, A/RES/52/164 (1997), reprinted in 37
ILM 251 (1998). This convention has been either signed, ratified, or acceded to by Algeria,
Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Sudan, Pakistan, and Yemen. See <http://untreaty.un.org/English/
Status/Chapterxviii/treaty9.asp> (visited Sept 18, 2003).
This is in reference to the Sunnah, or habitual practice of Muhammad, Islam's prophet. See
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Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Prindples of IslamicJuriorudence44 (Islamic Texts Society rev ed
1997). The Sunnah is the second primary source of the Shari'ah.
See Yusuf al-Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibitedin Islam (Al-HalalWal-Haram Fil Islam)
136-41 (American Trust 1999) (Kamal El-Helbawy, M. Moinuddin Siddiqui, and Syed
Shukry, trans, reviewed by Ahmad Zaki Hammad).
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Charter in particular, to be merely heretical innovations of the West designed to
subjugate the world's Muslim population. Indeed, as Dr. El-Ayouty pointed out
in his article on international terrorism, invoking the Shari'ah as a basis for
compliance with international law would be a powerful and authoritative tool in
delegitimizing the supposed Islamic framework within which Muslim terrorists
work.i5 Invoking the Shari'ah as a basis for compliance would deny them a
"competitive advantage" in recruiting new members and, perhaps even more
importantly, supporters.26 While Dr. El-Ayouty believes that applying Islamic
law would be of considerable assistance "in the areas of extradition, prosecution,
and punishment of Muslim terrorists," he states, "its most immediate effect
would be to peel the label of 'Muslim' off the
perpetrators of this new type of
27
war which goes on under the name of Islam.
Islam places a special emphasis on both achieving and maintaining peace.
The very word "Islam" derives from the same root in Arabic as the word for
peace, "salaam. ' N Islamic law discourages, at every opportunity, activities that
work toward anarchy and violence by "criminaliz[ing] individuals, groups, and
government authorities involved in anti-peace actions., 29 The Qur'an says, "[a]s
often as they light a fire for war, Allah [God] extinguishes it. Their effort is for
corruption in the land, and Allah loves not those who work corruption."3
One of the many general legal principles outlined in the Qur'an states,
"[d]o not take the life which Allah has rendered sacrosanct, except rightfully."31
This verse delivers a general prohibition pertaining to the taking of life, as well as
a narrow exception. The "except rightfully" provision has become the de facto
mantra for many Muslim extremists, yet it has been incorrectly applied. The
Qur'anic exception was meant to be applied by the Islamic state vis-Ai-vis its own
judicial system, as "[t]he monopoly of force and the means of law enforcement
lie entirely in the hands of the State. 3 2 Accordingly, extremist nonstate actors
have no footing under the Shari'ah as they have no standing to apply the "except
rightfully" exception to their own actions. Hence the function of the state
applying Islamic law is to administer justice, not to interfere with it. This
includes the duty under Islamic law to uphold extradition and mutual legal
assistance treaties with other nations.
25

Yassin E1-Ayouty, International Terrorism under the Law, 5 ILSA J Intl & Comp L 485, 491

(1999).
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J Milton Cowan, ed, Hans Wehr: A Dictionay of Modern Written Arabic 495-97 (Spoken
Language Services 4th ed 1994).
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El-Ayouty, 5 ILSA J Intl & Comp L at 490 (cited in note 25).
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The Majestic Qurdn: An English Rendition of Its Meanings ch 5, verse 64 at 118 (Starlatch 4th ed
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2000).
Id at ch 17, verse 33 at 285.
E1-Ayouty, 5 ILSA J Intl & Comp L at 489 (cited in note 25).
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
"ISLAMIC"

COUNTRIES

Universal jurisdiction, a form of prescriptive jurisdiction, takes the notion
of the application of a nation's laws one step further and designates certain
crimes as so heinous that any nation in the world can exercise its authority to
stop it-thus severing the link between the alleged activity and physical location.
National courts may claim the right to exercise universal jurisdiction, though this
is often controversial.33 However, universal jurisdiction may also be asserted by
an international criminal tribunal, such as the newly-established ICC. The basic
premise of the ICC is "to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community] and thus to
contribute to the prevention of such crimes., 3 4 With such a lofty goal in mind, it
is interesting to examine the initial 1998 vote on the Rome Statute, pursuant to
which the ICC was created. One hundred and twenty countries initially signed
the Statute, and seven countries voted against it.3" Out of the seven countries
that opposed the formation of the 1CC, four were countries with predominantly
Muslim populations purporting to apply at least some measure of Islamic law.36
States were free to subsequently sign on to the Rome Statute, as long as they did
so by December 31, 2000. After that date, a nation wishing to grant jurisdiction
to the ICC could only accede to the Rome Statute.
In the time between mid-July 1998 and the end of 2000, many nations did
sign on to the Rome Statute. Included among these countries were the United
States, Israel, and Yemen-three of the original seven dissenting parties. Though
the US is a signatory to the Rome Statute, it has not yet ratified it and is
extremely unlikely to do so in the near future. Looking toward the rest of the
Muslim world, eleven more countries signed the Statute in the interim period.37
33

A well-known example of a nation asserting universal jurisdiction occurred in the case of

Adolf Eichmann.
See Attorny General of the Government of Israel v Eicbmann, CrC
(Jerusalem), [1965] 45 Psakim Mehoziim 3 (1961), affd, CrA, 16 Piske Din 2033
(1962) (Israel), translated in 36 ILR 5 (1968). Israel invaded Argentinean territory in order to
kidnap Adolf Eichmann, a high-ranking SS officer during Nazi Germany. Argentina
protested, and the UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning the Israeli
government's actions and ordering reparations. Argentina did not demand Eichmann's
return, opting to accept an official apology from the Israeli government. Eichmann was
subsequently convicted and executed under Israeli law.
34

Preamble, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc No
A/CONF 183/9, reprinted in 37 ILM 999, 1002 (1998) (hereinafter Rome Statute).
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See Anthony Lewis, At HomeAbroad:A Turn in the Road, NY Times A15 (July 20, 1998).
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Id. The four predominantly Muslim countries were Libya, Iraq, Qatar, and Yemen. The
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remaining three countries voting against the ICC were China, Israel, and the United States.
Algeria signed the Rome Statute on December 28, 2000; Bahrain signed on December 11,
2000; Egypt signed on December 26, 2000; Iran signed on December 31, 2000; Jordan
signed on October 7, 1998; Nigeria signed on June 1, 2000; Oman signed on December 20,
2000; the Philippines signed on December 28, 2000; Sudan signed on September 8, 2000;
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However, one may gain insight as to the motives of these countries, and other
late signatories, by scrutinizing the timing of the signatures. According to the
rules regarding the development of the ICC, only signatory states can play a role
in the development process. Of the twelve overall Muslim-majority countries to
become signatories, five did so with less than ten days remaining. It would seem
that the last-minute signatures resulted, at least in part, from a desire to allow the
respective governments to have an influence on the development of the ICC.38
This theory is further borne out by examining the subsequent ratifications of the
Rome Statute. On the whole, 92 of the 139 signatories have ratified the Rome
Statute, constituting a 66 percent overall ratification rate.39 Returning to the
twelve Muslim countries, only two have ratified the Rome Statute since the end
40
of 2000, comprising an analogous ratification rate of less than 17 percent.
Contrary to the signing of the Rome Statute, there is no deadline for a
country to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Although the ICC may in some
instances assert universal jurisdiction over the citizens of nonsignatories to the
Rome Statute,4' wider acceptance of ICC jurisdiction in Muslim countries
through ratification of the Rome Statute would go a long way toward effecting
change in these countries. Leaders of these countries, often autocratic despots,
could be held accountable because of the potential for future ICC prosecutions,
with no question as to the validity of the assertion of universal jurisdiction or the
impartiality of the forum.4 2 At the very least, this potential for future liability

38
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40
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Syria signed on November 29, 2000; and the United Arab Emirates signed on November 27,
2000. See Coalition for the ICC, Signature and Ratification Chart, available online at
<http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html>
(visited Sept 18,
2003).
See Clinton's Words: 'The RightAction," NY Times A6 (Jan 1, 2001).
See Coalition for the 1CC, Signature and Ratification Chart (cited in note 37).
Id. The Muslim countries comprise a portion of the overall ratification rate, making it lower
than it would otherwise be. Thus the disparity between the two rates is actually larger than it
would appear. Afghanistan, then under the rule of the Taliban, did not sign the original treaty
but acceded to it on February 10, 2003. Afghanistan is omitted from the present analysis.
The ICC, unlike other international courts, has the ability to assert jurisdiction over
individuals. The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes occurring in either of two situations: when
the crime occurs in the territory of a signatory state or when the accused is the national of a
state party to the Rome Statute. Rome Statute art 12(2) (cited in note 34). The former
scenario allows for the possibility of the ICC asserting jurisdiction over citizens of
nonsignatories to the Rome Statute and has been a major bone of contention for opponents
of the ICC. See generally Jack Goldsmith, The SelfDefieating InternationalCiuinalCourt, 70 U
Chi L Rev 89 (2003).
This is not to say that there would be no prosecution of world leaders who may violate
international law in the absence of the ICC. See Pinochet, 1 AC at 147 (UK) (cited in note 18)
(abrogating Augusto Pinochet's sovereign immunity under international law as a former head
of state and resulting in his being subject to extradition for the crime of torture during his
rule of Chile). This decision, arguably resting on the concept of universal jurisdiction, was
controversial. See Sarah C. Rispin, Implications of Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium on the Pinochet Precedent: A Setback for InternationalHumnan Ri'ghts Li'igation?,3 Chi J
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should serve as a deterrent from committing more egregious crimes. In addition,
terrorists who once counted on safe havens in Muslim countries would face a
greater risk of prosecution. ICC membership will ensure, as much as possible,
the prosecution of international terrorists in an unbiased setting. This might be
preferred to extradition for prosecution in national courts on the basis of
universal jurisdiction. Moreover, domestic citizens who are victims of such
crimes will no longer have to depend on the deficient prosecution procedures
and remedies that exist in many Muslim countries.
A common concern with joining the ICC has been that it would usurp
Islamic law's exclusive jurisdiction, and substitute the law of man for the law of
God. Although many compromises have been suggested to include Muslim
countries despite this concern,43 the response of most Muslim countries has
been to shun the ICC. Though joining the ICC involves a measure of
jurisdictional acquiescence, it does not necessarily involve abdicating the power
to prosecute criminals domestically. The ICC, in its present form, provides a
"safety-valve" of sorts. Member-states, once notified of impending prosecution
by the ICC, may, in good faith, take up prosecution of the alleged crime
themselves. 4 This allows countries fearful of improper or incompatible ICC
results to try cases domestically. Paradoxically, the ICC may be able to achieve
its goals without ever trying a case-by simply spurring the domestic
prosecution of crimes, when they had been previously ignored or improperly
tried. Because the grant of jurisdiction is limited, the ICC is squarely within the
Shari'ah's permitted realm of freedom of contract.
IV. CONCLUSION
The faithful application of Islamic law in predominantly Muslim countries
can and should serve in promoting world peace. The Shari'ah may work in
conjunction with international law in achieving this end, without sacrificing any
of Islam's legal ideals. Despite this, the International Criminal Court provides an
opportunity to predominantly Muslim countries and other countries that seek to
bolster law abidance in these regions. ICC membership for these nations would
aid in many respects: it would promote domestic justice by deterring prohibited

43
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Ind Law 527 (2002). A major advantage of the ICC in such cases is that it would be
recognized as a more objective forum.
See, for example, Persian Gulf: The Question of War Crimes; Hearing before the Committee
on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 102d Cong, 1st Sess 16 (1991) (testimony of
Senator Jesse Helms suggesting that any international criminal court include a separate court
to try Islamic law).
This is generally referred to as the principle of complementarity. It gives the ICC jurisdiction
over a case only if state authorities do not take up the case. See Kenneth Roth, The Court the
US Doesn't Want 45 (NY Rev Books 1998), reprinted in Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston,
InternationalHuman R'ghts in Context: Law, Poliics, Morals 1195 (Oxford 2d ed 2000).
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crimes domestically, provide an unbiased setting for the prosecution of alleged
terrorists and criminals, reduce the risk of incurring sanctions or military action
or retaliation, and provide a safety-valve against potential ICC bias by permitting
domestic prosecution.
Modern times have presented unique and dynamic problems. Interestingly,
one of the most overlooked avenues to solving what may be the greatest
problem of our time-international terrorism-comes from the intersection of a
system of law more ancient than English common law, the Shari'ah, and the
newest and perhaps most controversial international institution, the ICC. As UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted, this problem "is a global menace which
clearly calls for global action. Individual actions by Member states, whether
aimed at state or nonstate actors, cannot in themselves provide a solution. We
must meet this threat together."4 Voluntary participation of Muslim countries in
the ICC may provide an unbiased multilateral alternative to national
prosecutions of terrorists, and therefore increase support for such multilateral
prosecutions in the Muslim world.
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UN GAOR, 53d Sess, 7th plenary mtg at 3, UN Doc No A/53/PV.7 (1998).
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